How the News was received in England

The English "man in the street," who until then had been profoundly unaware of Italian diplomatic manoeuvres to annex Ethiopia, opened his newspaper sixty years ago to learn that, for the first time since the Carthagian Hannibal marched into the Valley of the Po some two thousand years earlier, an army from Africa had decisively defeated a large and well equipped European force. It is interesting to examine how these events were presented to the British public by The Times, and how that semi-official newspaper explained what it considered to be the interest of the British Government.

The dramatic news from Africa immediately resulted in the collapse of the Italian Government of Signer Crispi, which was considered responsible for the defeat. Newspapers all over the world were therefore con- fronted almost simultaneously with exciting war reports and news of an Italian Cabinet crisis. The Rome Government had of course been deeply implicated in the Ethiopian war and only a few days before the battle, The Times had published a revealing report from its Rome correspondent which illustrates Franco-Italian jealousy about the intended partition of the Horn of Africa. It asserted that the Italian Government was aware of "a secret treaty" between France and Ethiopia in which the French were supporting Menelik in order to discomfort Italy. The Paris Temps immediately denied what it called this "extraordinary" report, while a despatch from the Paris correspondent of The Times made it apparent that colonially minded sections of French public opinion, though opposed to Italy as a rival colonial power, were unwilling to side with the invaded country because it was situated on the African Continent.

" No one here—I have not to take notice of this or that scatter-brained person, or a few habitually malevo- lent minds—wishes for the success of the Abyssinians at the price of the discomfiture of a civilised nation, from which it is quite possible to differ in aims and opinions without being supposed to cherish any ill-will when that nation is face to face with a brave but bar- barous foe."

Despite these words, the Paris correspondent averred that there was a tendency in French circles to be "rather kindly disposed " toward " the presence of serious diffi- culties for Italy in Africa." He was confident, how- ever, that the "somewhat bitter complaints" of the Italian politicians would "induce no revival of hostility" against Italy in France.

The great Ethiopian victory necessarily changed the entire picture. The Times, which until then had referred to the Ethiopians as a "barbarous foe," now chided General Baratieri for imagining that he was confronted with "undisciplined and ill-armed savages"; as we shall see, a few days later, the newspaper declared that the Ethiopians were "a civilised power both in the way they made war and in the way they conducted their diplomacy." On March 6, it discussed the Italian politi- cal crisis in the following words:
" Though the Crispi Government cannot be held directly responsible for the Italian defeat at Adowa, it was certain that General Baratieri's blunder would bring about its overthrow . . . Signor Crispi's action appears to have the approval of moderate men . . . but the extreme Left, enraged by the curtailment of its oppor- tunities for vituperation, has not been able to control its temper either within the Chamber or outside. The sitting seems to have closed in hopeless confusion, while Radical Deputies placed themselves at the head of excited mobs, marching through the streets with loud cries for the impeachment of the fallen Ministers. It is, happily, difficult for human nature to remain long at fever-heat. The very violence of these demonstrations tends to shorten their duration, so that after a certain amount of shouting, gesticulating and anathematising, we may expect the Piazza Colonna to regain its wonted calm and the people to regain the rational consideration of events.''

Reporting that the Marquis di Rudini had set up what was to prove a merely interim administration the news- paper alluded to other Italian problems:
" While the excitement in Rome arises naturally out of the profound chagrin with which a sensitive people receives the news of a great calamity, there are threats of disturbance in other parts of Italy which are of a more disquieting character. In Sicily there is chronic disaffection, which, it will be remembered, was not long ago suppressed or driven under by Signor Crispi. His fall in circumstances so deplorable will undoubtedly prove a great encouragement to all the disorderly fac- tions ... It must therefore be hoped by all friends of Italy that, whether under the Marquis di Rudini or another, a Government may be promptly formed cap- able of steadily maintaining the authority of the laws." Despite the hopes of such "friends of Italy," riots were reported from Rome, Naples, Milan and the other prin- cipal cities, and a telegram even reached London, report- ing the assassination of ex-premier Crispi. On the following day, March 7, it was learnt, however, that this report was unfounded, a Times editorial declaring: " the good name of the Italian people has not been dis- honoured in its hour of trial by the crime of a maddened mob." The editorial went on to recall that "the Italians of to-day" were "the descendants and the heirs of the people whose Senate thanked an erring and defeated General, after the crushing disaster of Cannae because he had not despaired of the Republic." The news- paper would "not permit" itself "to discuss the possi- bility that the (Savoyan) dynasty may be threatened" as "a revolution in Italy would be unspeakably calami- tous to the country itself and would menace the tran- quillity of the whole of Europe." (These arguments were to be voiced again almost half a century later when it was thought that action by the League of Nations might possibly bring Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 to a halt). Advising the Italian people not to display such "ingratitude" to King Humbert, whose father had "played so noble a part in winning and consolidating Italian unity and freedom," The Times advised a policy of caution and compromise as best cal- culated to serve Italian interests in Africa:
" What is to be deprecated in the interests of Italy is the hasty and inconsiderate adoption of a policy of extremes. Some of her counsellors support the present outcry of the populace for an immediate and uncon- ditional retirement from Abyssinia. Others exhort her at all costs to wipe out what is represented as a stain upon her honour by renewing her military and financial efforts on a greater scale than ever. Both courses, in our opinion, are equally unwise. A complete and pre- cipitate withdrawal would be surely and speedily repented, and the responsibility for it would be urged against the King's Government at no distant date by those whose interest it is to create troubles. On the other hand, it is absurd to say that the honour of Italy can only be secured by undertaking the conquest of Abyssinia—a task which would not be hopefully attempted in the existing state of public opinion. Her true policy would appear to be that of withdrawing from the mountain region where General Baratieri met his ruin, as well as from Kassala, where she is threatened by the Dervishes, and holding Massawah with the domi- nating positions in the neighbourhood, as a pied-a-terre from which to watch events. Thus the present might be made safe while the future would not be com- promised." However "natural" the impulse "to pour in men and munitions" to avenge the defeat, the political horizon was "not so clear," The Times added a few days later, that Italy could not "afford to entangle herself in adventures which there is no hope of carrying to a successful issue except by means of exhausting expen- diture and persevering effort."

Meanwhile the Parliamentary crisis dragged on in Italy and fuller news of the debacle of Adowa poured in. On March 9, The Times had much to say on both subjects. Discussing the battle, detailed news of which had at last reached England, the newspaper seemed almost to be fighting the engagement a second time; it went to considerable length to point out Baratieri's tacti- cal errors. Being pro-Italian it repeatedly referred to the Ethiopian army as "the Shoans," though in fact the principal provinces of Ethiopia were all included in the armies at Adowa, and in particular the Tigre, which the Italians had assiduously endeavoured to detach from its loyalty to the Ethiopian Empire.

The Times' account is as follows:
" The latest accounts place the Italian loss in the battle of Adowa at a figure so high that we cannot but hope there is a serious mistake somewhere. It is esti- mated at no less than 7,000 white and 2,000 native troops, though what proportion of the missing are killed and how many are prisoners it is at present impossible to say. As the total number of troops engaged in the attack is given as 15,000 and cannot have been very easily in excess of that number, the disaster has clearly been one of quite exceptional magnitude. One-half the forces, and, if the figures are correct, much more than one-half seem to have disappeared. Italians will find a melancholy consolation in the fact that their troops fought with desperate gallantry. One division seems to have been practically destroyed where it stood, after inflicting enormous loss upon the enemy. It was prob- ably owing to the severity of their punishment that the Shoans abstained in a manner otherwise unaccountable from a pursuit which might have rendered the catas- trophe even more appalling. They have evidently now followed up their victory for Adigrat is invested, and the position of its garrison renders the whole situation infinitely more difficult to deal with. Adigrat is not upon the direct line of retreat, and General Baratieri seems to have been too hard pressed either to turn aside and avoid leaving the road to Asmara open to the Abyssinians, or even to give the garrison timely notice of its impending isolation. With 600 sick in hospital its movements were seriously hampered, and the enemy seem to have been within a few kilometres before the commander was aware of his danger. From the tone of his message it may be doubted whether he is even now acquainted with the full extent of his disaster, for he speaks cheerfully of having a month's provisions. So far as can be judged at the present there is little chance of relief reaching Adigrat within a month in face of what is plainly a forward movement on the part of the Abyssinians.

" While the Italian troops displayed splendid valour, their generals seem to have set at defiance all the elemen- tary rules of warfare, and especially of mountain war- fare. The Shoan army was posted upon an elevated plateau to the number, it is said, of 80,000 men. General Baratieri must have had abundant opportunities of learn- ing of their equipment and the use they could make of it, consequently he can hardly have imagined that he was dealing with undisciplined and ill-armed savages. Yet he behaved as if nothing were in front of him but a rabble which would melt away on contact with disci- plined troops. He attacked that plateau with three divisions, marching through three valleys or ravines, and therefore completely isolated and incapable of mutual support. He neglected the elementary rule never to engage your forces in a defile without occupying the hills that command it. The rocky heights that effectively separated his columns were taken possession of by the Shoans with the utmost facility, because they practically entered on the level. They could therefore flank each of General Baratieri's divisions, which struggling in the narrow passes, had no room for the evolutions required to offer even such defence as was possible against such odds. To attack such an enemy at all on the front was a serious blunder, but to attack in that particular manner shows an almost incredible disregard of the rudimentary principles of military science. The motives which impelled General Baratieri to push forward regardless of the danger to which he exposed his reinforcements he knew to be on the way, and to make his ill-judged attack without awaiting their arrival, almost baffle con- jecture. It would, however, be well to await further details before attributing his impatience purely to per- sonal motives. Italy is not the only Power which on political or religious pretexts interests herself in Abys- sinia, and it is just conceivable that there were political motives for pressing the unfortunate General to score some success if possible, even at the serious risk of failure."

Turning to the political situation in Italy, the news- paper announced that Signor Saracco had failed in his efforts to form a cabinet. It continued:
" On the immediate question of the policy to be pur- sued in Abyssinia, the Cabinet will have to come to a decision which, whatever its nature, will arouse opposi- tion from one side or another. Each of the three pos- sible policies has its advocates. With a large section of the nation the whole Abyssinian enterprise is unpopular, and nothing short of complete abandonment would satisfy some critics. On the other hand, the feelings of a high-spirited people are profoundly stirred by the crushing reverse at Adowa, which to many will seem to1 call for the most determined efforts to regain the position that has been lost. Between these two is the middle course which we have ventured to urge upon the Italian Government that of rigorous concentration within an area capable of being, defended without exces- sive effort."

Elaborating this proposal, the editorial concluded: " Italy need not abandon any of her claims or renounce any project that careful consideration may show to be feasible. But in the meantime a defensive and waiting policy seems to be clearly indicated alike by military and political motives."

The Times deeply regretted the fact that a European army had been decisively defeated by a "native" force. It now stressed the difference between the Ethiopians and other inhabitants of Africa, then also confronted with imperialist pressure. The Ethiopians, it declared, were a "civilised power both in the way they made war and in the way they conducted their diplomacy." They should, therefore, not be confused with "savage tribes incapable of making a stand against a regular European attack."

Discussing the outcome of the campaign The Times added:
" It was true that, in some respects, the military disaster seems to be less crushing than was supposed. The Abyssinian generals do not appear to have followed up their victory with the vigour enjoined by all the masters of the art of war. Hence the actual destruction of the Italian forces is less complete than it might easily have been and has been assumed to be." Moreover, considerable numbers of stragglers were turning up at Italian headquarters. The newspaper continued: " Unfortunately this is about the only gleam of con- solation that can be found in the story of a most dis- astrous enterprise. Though the men remain, the army has sustained a deadly blow. Such a reverse, accom- panied by heavy loss of artillery, cannot but prove demoralising to any force and specially to one largely composed of native levies. The more we learn about the matter, the more serious does it become from this point of view."

All this merely served to strengthen the newspaper's conviction that it would be "unwise" for Italy to attempt a policy of immediate revenge. It added: " Were the Shoan army to make an energetic forward movement, it would be difficult to assign limits to the embarrassments of the Italian Government." Actually, as we shall see, the Emperor Menelik con- fined his advance to the frontier existing at the time, Ras Makonnen signed in Rome on Ethiopia's behalf the annexe to the Treaty of Uccialli, even though the Italians by trickery had advanced that frontier beyond the line they occupied when the Treaty was signed. The attitude of The Times was thus one of friendship for the aggressor, qualified only by a criticism of Italian tactical mistakes. Thus it declared that the Italians had " to do more than merely reconsider the plan of opera- tions followed, under considerable pressure from home, by General Baratieri. They have to revise their whole policy towards Abyssinia, and if on mature consideration they think it necessary to attempt the conquest of the country, they must make up their minds to efforts very much greater and more exhausting than they have hitherto contemplated."

Developing this train of thought the same editorial concluded: "It is felt at this moment, in every European capital, that the position in Italy is critical, and her action is watched, if with varying sympathies, at all events with unvarying closeness of attention. A mere African expe- dition against nomad tribes would not affect her general position or call forth all this anxiety. It is seen that she is involved in an enterprise of a totally different kind, which, if persevered in, cannot but profoundly affect all her European relations. Her allies of the Triple Alli- ance are exhibiting the most unmistakable symptoms of concern."

Discussing the British attitude the newspaper was brutally frank:
"The sympathies of this country cannot be thought doubtful for an instant. Englishmen have a sincere and enduring friendship for Italy, while English policy regards her as an essential and most valuable factor in the political equilibrium of Europe. Her aims in Abyssinia we in this country regard without the faintest tinge of jealousy, while her general well-being, political and financial is earnestly desired."

The fact that The Times admitted that Ethiopia was a "civilised power," both in her methods of warfare and in her diplomacy, renders cynical the sympathy accorded to Italy in her unprovoked and unscrupulous aggression and the assertion that she "need not abandon her claims," but she should bide her time to strike again at Ethiopian freedom at some favourable opportunity. Italy's claim to govern Ethiopia, we have seen, was based on a discreditable trick—the inclusion in the Italian version of the Treaty of Uccialli of words which did not appear in the Ethiopian version, the only one which the Emperor Menelik signed. British sympathy for Italian aggression had, in fact, three motives: (1) Hope that Italian expansion would prevent the French from obtaining influence in the area in question; (2) desire to win possible Italian support in the Mediter- ranean; (3) fear less the defeat of a European Power by an African nation would create unrest in British colonies.

When order was at last established in Italy The Times devoted a leader to the situation on March 11, wherein it expressed its thankfulness that the Italian Government appeared to have adopted the course of action it had itself been recommending. It declared: "After the first outburst of national grief and disap- pointment men are settling down to calm and earnest consideration of the condition of affairs . . . Popular demonstrations against the despatch of reinforcements to Massawa have given place to a general conviction that, whatever decision may be ultimately arrived at as to Italian policy, it is indispensable that General Baldissera should receive all the support he may deem necessary. Those responsible, whether immediately or approxi- mately, for the disaster at Adowa, will undoubtedly be called to account in good time. But for the moment the more pressing duty is to effect the relief of the garrisons at Adigrat and Kassala. and to offer the Negus a front sufficiently formidable to make Italy once more mistress of her actions in Eritrea.

" The fact must be faced, although it is nowhere more sincerely deplored than in England, that events in Abyssinia constitute a grave embarrassment for Italy, no matter in what way they may be dealt with . . . Italy is most unfortunately involved in a difficulty which cannot be immediately shaken oft' by anything she can do; and to that extent she is hampered in any other enter- prise she may desire to pursue."

The columns of The Times make interesting reading throughout the first half of 1896. The St. Petersburg Correspondent, for example, reported that some 12,000 roubles had been collected in Russia for an "Abyssinian fund," but that the Italian authorities were obstructing a Russian Red Cross mission to Ethiopia which had been despatched at a cost of 130,000 roubles. "The conse- quence is that the nursing sisters, with part of the baggage have been ordered back to Russia, and the rest of the party are obliged to make a much longer and very difficult journey though desert country with no prospect of arriving at Menelik's camp before the rainy season . . . These painful details have been officially announced at a special meeting of the Red Cross Society." Tsarist Russia was, in fact, the only European power to champion Ethiopia at the time of Adowa. The rulers of St. Petersburg had close religious ties with the Ethiopian Church, were totally devoid of colonial ambitions in Africa, and were, moreover, anxious to dis- comfort the Italians, at that time the allies of Germany and Austria, a rival European power group. In April, The Times reported the despatch of a Russian scientific mission to Ethiopia led by M. Dimitreff, which was closely followed by General Shvedoff, " several military officers" and a priest. The newspaper felt the matter deserved a leading article which ridiculed the fact that the Russian Red Cross chaplain had brought with him "20,000 small crosses of the Orthodox pattern," com- plained that the officers were seeking to stir the troubled waters for sinister reasons and warned the statesmen of the French Republic that the Imperialism of the Tsar might be more dangerous to their Red Sea colony than that of their Italian neighbours." " The sudden develop- ment of Russian interest in the Abyssinians," it declared, "is a subject for the curiosity of Europe . . . Russia, it is true, is not more noted in the annals of philan- thropy for any unusual eagerness to succour than for zeal in ministering to their spiritual necessities. As a rule her works of mercy, both corporal and spiritual, are rigidly restricted to members of the Slav race. But as she has manifested lately an unexpected concern for the religious welfare of the subjects of King Menelik, it is quite natural that she should likewise display an exceptional solicitude for his wounded soldiers . . . Russian military officers have proved most effective missionaries before now, and perhaps the Abyssinians may harken to them for the present . . . Several of of the Balkan States have enjoyed in an unexpected fashion, the beneficence of the Tsar. Servia wanted money, Montenegro wanted rifles, and the ruler of Bulgaria had cravings to be recognised by the Powers . . . The Russian adventure in the domains of King Menelik seems rather worthy of Count Ignatiefl (the leader of Russia's 'military party' advocating the manifest destiny of Holy Russia and general Slav ex- pansion) ... It is not, perhaps, very likely to succeed, but if it does succeed nobody will have more cause to regret its success than France. The Republic will find the Tsar a much more unpleasant neighbour to Obok than the Italians."

In May, The Times reported the issue of an Italian Government Green Book. Though the publication of this volume had clearly been devised by the Italians to blame their debacle on lack of support from Britain, it also contained interesting diplomatic revelations. In particular, it showed that after much discussion the British Government had agreed on the eve of the battle to allow the Italian army to land at the port of Zeila and pass through Somali territory so as to divert Ethiopian forces southwards for the defence of Harar. The Times strongly criticised the publication of this Green Book, declaring that it was calculated to stir up anti-British feeling in Italy, and was so arranged as to bring into "undue prominence" the points of difference between the two powers so that "the substantial agree- ment on essentials was in no small danger of being ignored." On the projected campaign against Harar it commented:
" The point of most interest to ourselves in the docu- ments is the account they give of the negotiations opened up by Italy in respect of Zeila. The Italians, at one period of the campaign, believed that by landing troops at that port and marching them in the direction of Harar, they could distract the attention of the Abyssinians and divert a portion of their forces from the theatre of operations further north. General Ferrero, the Italian Ambassador in this country, was instructed to ask our permission for the landing of the troops. The British Government were quite willing and even anxious to give the Italians any aid they rightly could give them, but the objection to the proposal was obvious. It was possible that the column operating from Zeila might be repulsed and driven back upon Somaliland. Were we to endanger a British possession from a desire to assist a friendly people?"

There was, moreover, another diplomatic obstacle— the opposition of France. The Times continues: "France regarded the project with intense jealousy, and we were naturally reluctant to give her any just grounds of offence, either of a general kind or arising from our agreement with her in regard to Harar itself. These topics were discussed with the freedom usual in diplomatic conversations of a confidential nature between Lord Salisbury and General Ferrero, in London, and between Sir Clare Ford and Baron Blanc, in Rome . . . The project was received, and in January of the present year Lord Salisbury assented to the passage of the Italian troops through Zeila while making reservations to spare any just susceptibilities on the part of France. At various points in the negotiation of this extremely difficult and complex affair, our Government were not able at once to accept the view of the Italians, and on one occasion especially Baron Blanc, in conversa- tion with the British Ambassador, in Rome, signified his annoyance in very plain terms. Exaggerated language was employed, and in possible contingencies action was spoken of which, doubtless, it was never intended to carry out. These conversations have been published in the Green Book, and it is difficult to suppose that they can have been published with any object but one. That object certainly was not to inform the Italian people as to what the relations between Great Britain and Italy really were at the close of the Crispi Administration. Those relations were always friendly, as they are friendly now. They depend on interests too deep and solid to be affected by petty questions in remote parts of Africa. Our friendship rests upon our common interests and our common objects in the Mediterranean, and while those remain it can never be shaken."