The Battle

The campaign of Adowa may be said to have opened between January 24 and 30, 1896, when the Emperor Menelik, taking advantage of Ras Makonnen's victories at Amba Alagi and Makaile, proceeded to march forward to Hausen and thence to Adowa. This advance out- manoeuvred the Italian commander, General Baratieri, whose communications with his base were threatened, the Ethiopians having advanced nearer to Asmara than he was himself. Accordingly, on February 1, the Italian commander moved back the bulk of his army from Edagahamus to Mai Gabeta, and two days later con- centrated his forces between Mai Gabeta and Entichio. Menelik's armies had meanwhile taken up positions on the hills to the north-east of Adowa, only some five miles away. The two armies, which had once faced each other looking north and south respectively, thus faced east and west and were in close enough proximity to open hostilities.

The Italians were, however, finding their communica- tions difficult. The country was so mountainous that transport animals moved slowly and had often to climb dangerous precipices, which were rendered even more dangerous by the activity of hostile forces in the rear. Two local chiefs, Ras Sebath and Ras Agas Tafari, who knew the country well and upon whom the Italians had relied for help, had recently come out in support of Menelik; Epizootic disease had broken out, with the result that only about 20 per cent, of the local mules were fit for service. Finally, Italian morale was dis- integrating. Baratieri and members of his staff quarrelled about the strategy of the campaign, while all sorts of rumours circulated among officers and men. It was said that agents from the Ethiopian side entered the Italian camp with impunity, while the Italians, who could not rely on the support of the native population, often used spies who were, in fact, on Menelik's side and that Baratieri was the only person who believed their reports. Italian field maps were, moreover, com- pletely inaccurate.

Baratieri's plan was to remain entrenched in his position and wait there in the hope that Menelik would attack or be forced to retire through lack of provisions. The difficulty at this time was that although the Ethiopians could marshal very large forces they had no transport services to bring up supplies from the rear. The huge army and its hordes of camp followers and servants had, therefore, to rely on what could be pro- cured locally; if this source failed it was necessary to march into other areas. Baratieri, for his part, was determined not to move from his camp, as to do so was dangerous in view of the difficulty of the land and the enmity of the populace. Baratieri, we may add, was personally unpopular in the area; A. B. Wylde observes that he had " a very bad name at Adowa, owing to the cruelties that took place when he first occupied the town."

Ras Alula

Menelik, who had taken up his final position at Adowa on January 21, was also determined to wait for his opponent to make the first move. On January 23 he had ordered Ras Mangesha, Ras Makonnen, Fitaurari Gabre Ehu, Fitaurari Tekle and Likemekusas Adanou to march northwards to Addi Koula, where they were to await his arrival, but this force had been obliged to return to base on account of shortage of water. On the following day, January 24, the Italians had made a show of attacking, but as soon as the Ethiopians moved out to give battle they had returned to their fort, much to the discontent of the Ethiopians, who complained that the enemy was like a tortoise which retreated into its shell whenever they approached. According to Gabre Sellassie's Chronicle of the Reign of Menelik the Emperor had at first been provoked into ordering an attack, but had been dissuaded by Ras Manglsha, of the Tigre, who had reminded him of the losses incurred by the Emperor Yohannes in attacking the fort of Metemma. Menelik had therefore decided not to move until the invader should launch his attack.

Accordingly, says Gabre Sellassie, the Ethiopian Com- mand, decided, after long discussions on February 26 and 27, that they would not attack unless the Italians themselves began operations; on the contrary, it was agreed that if there was no sign of the enemy moving, and their own men then searching for forage arrived in time, the army would proceed into Hamasien, probably on March 2. Such a move would once again have offered an opportunity of threatening the Italian lines of com- munication, but it was destined never to be attempted. Meanwhile, indecision reigned in the Italian camp.

Though well entrenched, Baratieri was increasingly pre- occupied with transport difficulties, and to make matters worse received on February 25 Prime Minister Crispi's fateful telegram, which told him that his Government, for political reasons, insisted on a victory and was " ready for any sacrifice." On February 28, however, Baratieri ordered his army to move back, as his position seemed to him unsatisfactory. It was the third time the hesitating commander had given this order only to countermand it. On this occasion some of the baggage began to move, but again Baratieri changed his mind. He asked for the advice of his four major-generals, who advised him to reverse his order and, instead of retreat- ing, to advance. Dabormida, doubtless having in mind Crispi's telegram, spoke for all when he said, " Italy would prefer the loss of two or three thousand men to a retreat which would seem dishonourable." Accordingly, on February 29, the decisive command to attack was given.

According to Ethiopian tradition Baratieri made the decision to attack because he had received intelligence that Menelik was in no position to resist. It is asserted that a certain Awalom, a villager of Entichio, had some time earlier made contact with the Italians by supplying them with eggs, chickens and other produce and had been given 200 dollars by Baratieri to undertake espionage work. Awalom, who, we are told, was a tall man of soldierly bearing, was entirely loyal to the Ethiopian cause and went immediately to Ras Mangesha to report upon the confidence which had been placed in him by the invader. It is related that Mangesha interrogated him privately and being convinced of the truth of his story dressed him as one of his own guards so as to avoid drawing attention to the matter. He then took him to Menelik and his generals. Ras Alula, who was present, urged that his services should be used to give false information to the enemy, and Menelik agreed to this and handed Awalom a sum of money.

Ras Mengesha

This the latter refused, offering the Emperor instead the 200 dollars he had received from the Italians as his own personal contribution to the war. Menelik laughingly refused this and asked the patriot to fall in with Alula's plan. Awalom agreed with regret as he had hoped to join Menelik's armies as a soldier. He then returned to Baratieri's camp where he is said to have told the Italian commander that it was necessary to attack at once as the Ethiopian army was scattered and busily engaged in searching for food. The statement that a large part of the army was engaged in this work was of course true and was confirmed by Baratieri's spies. Corroboration for these statements is to be found in the writings of A. B. Wylde. Asserting that Entichio' was altogether the wrong base for an attack on Adowa, he declares, " I have every reason to know that the (Italian) Intelligence Department was altogether at fault regarding the actual number of Abyssinian soldiers present and did not give them the credit for having the number of rifles or the quantity of ammunition they possessed."

Awalom, it is related, acted as guide to part of the Italian army and led them towards the armies of Ras Mangesha and Ras Alula. He then escaped from the invading army and joined the Ethiopian forces so that he could take part in the battle. He was later appointed the Chika-Shum of his village and given exemption from paying taxes. During the Italian occupation, which began forty years later, some of his relatives fled to Shire to avoid the invader's wrath; others were exiled to Nakura.

Ras Mikael

Baratieri's new plan was to advance by night in three columns, each made up of one brigade, with a fourth brigade following as a reserve in the rear. The objective was to occupy positions some nine miles forward and only four miles from the Ethiopians, who, it was hoped, would be obliged by this manoeuvre either to retreat or to retaliate.

A. B. Wylde's comments: " General Baratieri thought his attack would have been a complete surprise, and as Signor Crispi, the Prime Minister, wanted to meet his Parliament (which was discontented with the policy in Eritrea) with a victory, no reward for General Baratieri would have been too great had he succeeded, and, like a gamester, he threw his dice for a big coup and lost."

The country to be traversed was, in fact, extremely difficult and was inhabited by a hostile population. An Italian officer describing the physical features of the land subsequently referred to the "rugged slopes, precipitous and broken, abounding in ravines, gorges and crevasses; narrow and tortuous clefts in the hard rock; passes half- closed, steep and very difficult, and granite summits that rear themselves to the sky in the most strange forms and dimensions. The surface seemed like a stormy sea moved by the anger of God."

The Italian force at this time numbered 20,000 well- equipped men and 56 cannon*. This force, 17,700 strong (of which 10,596 were Italian and the remainder Eritrean) took part in the operation; 1,466 Italians and 1,600 Eritreans were left behind in the camp. The Ethiopians, on the other hand, were considerably more numerous, but, generally speaking, less well equipped. It is estimated that they comprised about 80,000 rifle- men, 8,600 cavalry, 20,000 spearmen and 42 cannon. According to Melli, these forces were divided among the principal Ethiopian commanders as follows:
......................................... Riflles Horses Guns
Emperor Menelik ................ 25,000 3,000 32
Empress Taitu .................... 3,000 600 4
King Tekla Haimanot .......... 5,000 — —
Ras Makonnen ................... 15,000 — —
Ras Mangasha and Alula ..... 12,000 — 6
Ras Mangasha Atichim ........ 6,000 — —
Ras Mikael ......................... 6,000 5,000 —
Ras Olie ............................. 8,000 — —
Totals ................................ 80,000 8,600 42

Battle Map

General Barartieri

The Ethiopian rifles were mainly breech-loaders obtained from French, Belgian, Russian and other travellers; their cannon were mainly well-nigh obsolete models, though they included a number of Hotchkiss guns which, according to A. B. Wyldet, were superior to anything the Italians possessed and were to prove of great value. The Italians, it must be noted, made no use of cavalry, despite the fact that the British had found them most useful during the Magdala campaign of 1867-8. Nor did they use heliographs during the battle, though these were available.

Adowa itself, and the heights above it, were occupied by Ras Makonnen and his Harari forces. To the right, south of the city on a high irregular plateau with its flanks protected by nearly perpendicular cliffs, up which there were only a few sheep paths, lay the troops of King Tekla Haimanot, with their cavalry thrown out at the foot of the cliffs amongst water meadows. On the left wing lay Ras Mikael with his Galla cavalry along the southern and south-western slopes of Mount Selado. Adjoining him on the north and north-west of that mountain was Ras Mangasha and his Tigrean troops, while on the extreme left, as far back as the heights of Adi Abuna, lay the forces of Ras Alula. Menelik and Empress Taitu made up the rear, being stationed near the ruins of the Jesuit Monastery at Fremona; they were encamped on rocky ground offering great opportunities for stubborn resistance, while at the same time within easy access of the rest of the army, so that if needed they could easily move up in support of Ras Alula, Ras Makonnen or Ras Mikael. Ras Woly was encamped on low ground to the south-west of the Fremona spur, immediately behind Ras Makonnen, whom he could reinforce in less than half an hour, while Wagshum Guangul lay behind Ras Makonnen and King Tekla Haimanot, either of whom he could join if needed. The Galla cavalry was encamped in some water meadows eight miles off.

The Italian advance began by the light of the moon at 9 p.m. on February 29, smoking being prohibited so that the movement of troops should not be observed by the unsuspecting Ethiopians. Dabormida's brigade was on the right, Arimondi's in the centre, and Albertone's on the left. Ellena, with the reserve brigade, followed Arimondi. From the outset, however, Baratieri found it impossible to keep the three lines abreast. Perhaps led astray by faulty intelligence he was himself slow to take up a central position in the Memsah valley and failed to place Ellena's reserves in a position where they could support either the flanks or centre. At about 2.30 a.m. on March 1, Albertone's brigade crossed that of Arimondi's and caused him a delay of 1 1/2 hours. At 3 he reached the hill named Kidane Meret on Baratieri's map (but not generally known by that name) which he had been ordered to occupy and where he was supposed to make contact with Arimondi. Not realising that he had delayed the latter he waited impatiently for half an hour and then began to think there was some mistake about the location, and, on consulting his guides, was told that Kidane Meret was some four and a-half miles further off from Sauria. After another half-hour's wait he therefore set off at full pace in the hope of catching up lost time, making for the true Kidane Meret which overlooked Adowa and was only three miles from Menelik's camp. There he found himself isolated and surrounded by Ethiopian troops, a fact which compelled the other brigades to fight all day with their left flank unguarded. When within 2 1/2 miles of his new objective he halted in an effort to make contact with the force he assumed to be on his right, but the advance guard failed to receive his order and continued to march, with the result that at 6 it found itself engaged all alone in fierce fighting.

Major-General Dabormida: "Italy would prefer the loss of two or three thousand men to a retreat which would seem dishonorouable

Meanwhile, the other units were moving according to plan. Baratieri himself reached Rebbi Arienni at 6. He heard some distant firing, but assumed it to be the scrapping of an advance guard and that Albertone was in his allotted position. Dabormida had reached a position not far from his commander; Arimondi had moved up the eastern slopes of the same high land; in the rear Ellena's reserve column came into sight. All seemed well, except that Albertone's levies, having taken a wrong path, were nowhere to be seen. The Italians had been counting on taking the Ethio- pians by surprise. Baratieri had only just sent a letter discussing peace terms, and it was only to be expected that hostilities would be deferred until a reply had been returned by Menelik or Ras Makonnen, who had been obtain provisions, and that the camp is almost empty, have decided to fall upon you by surprise." According to Gabre Sellassie, it was from Kagnaz- match Teffesse that Menelik was first warned of the surprise attack. " Do you really believe the enemy is going to attack and that this is not merely another trick to force me again to rally uselessly for battle?" asked the Emperor. " To-day it is certain," Teffesse replied. Orders were immediately given to prepare for battle, but it was not, says A. B. Wylde, until between 9 a.m. and 10 p.m. that the main Ethiopian force could be brought into action. Two-thirds of the army, Gabre Sellassie confirms, were not in the camp; part were foraging for food and part attending a service at the Church of Sion.

Major-General Arimondi

The first exchange of shots took place at about 6 a.m., when, as we have seen, Albertone's isolated force found itself in conflict with Ethiopian troops. The chronicler quaintly adds that their noise "resembled the rain of Hamle, which falls without stopping." At 6.45, Dabor- mida was ordered to occupy the spur of Belah which was more or less in the direction of the gunfire, and would have supported Albertone if he had in fact been where he was assumed to be. Unfortunately for Dabor- mida, instead of inclining to the left he inclined to the right and, therefore, instead of getting any nearer to the missing general, proceeded in a parallel line to him. Consequently, there was a 2 1/2 mile gap of mountainous country between them which the Ethiopians promptly occupied.

Baratieri, stationed on Rebbi Arienni, was meanwhile giving his orders on the altogether incorrect assumption that his forces were stationed in the positions he had ordered. At 8.15 he took up a stand on Mount Eshaho, and to his surprise saw that Albertone was seriously engaged. At 9, however, he received two notes from Albertone written at 7.30 and 8.15 respectively, stating that all was more or less well but that reinforcements would be acceptable. After reading these messages the commander galloped to Mount Rajo, where he saw to his dismay a routed army streaming back from Mount Rajo to Sauria. He sent officers in vain to stem the rout. The Ethiopians, declared Major Gommera, an eye-witness, had "manoeuvred with great skill" and finally charged with "a hurricane of 25,000 men"; the Italians fought back, "but cold, inexorable as death, a storm of lead arrested them."

On the Ethiopian side morale was high. The Empress Taitu, in particular, showed great fortitude and, in the words of the chronicler, "ceased to be a mere woman and appeared as a valiant soldier." When she saw the troops waver she cried out: "Courage, the victory is ours! Forward!"

Major-General Galliano

Baratieri, though now fully aware of the gravity of his position, was still wholly ignorant of the true state of affairs, and was without contact with units not in his own immediate vicinity. At 9.15 he sent a note to Dabormida, ordering him to cover Albertone's retire- ment, but the note was not delivered as the messenger met one from Dabormida bringing word that "he was holding out his hand to Albertone," and therefore thought it was useless to deliver the order. At 9.30 he ordered Albertone to retreat, but the messenger failed to get through, and eventually learned that Albertone had been killed and that his army was in full retreat. At 9.45 he sent forth a messenger to ascertain the where- abouts of Dabormida, but only received confused intelli- gence which turned out in fact to be altogether incorrect. At 10, and again at 10.15, he sent orders to Dabormida to move forward to support Albertone, but Dabormida was not to be found as he had already begun an advance which was to take him into the Mariam Shavita valley, where he was killed.

Baratieri now reinforced his left flank in the belief that the Spur of Belah, upon which everything depended, was still held by Dabormida, though in fact it was no longer occupied by any troops at all, Dabormida being four miles to the west. Consequently Ethiopian troops poured in, sweeping past Arimondi's right and cutting his line of retreat. The Ethiopians pursuing the routed Italians were, moreover, able to penetrate within rifle range as the Italians were unable to fire on them for fear of hitting their own stragglers.

Major-General Arimondi

The victorious Ethiopians south of Mount Belah now attacked the central forces of Arimondi; Galliano's Eritrean troops were accordingly brought up from reserve and placed on the southern slopes of Mount Rajo. At about this time, 10.15, another Ethiopian force swept over the Hill and Spur of Belah from the east, thereby cutting Baratieri completely from Dabormida and threatening Arimondi, this time from the right. At 10.30 Galliano's Eritrean force deserted to the Ethiopians, which enabled Menelik's forces to sweep forward in that sector, thus almost completely surrounding the Italians. Since both his flanks were now turned Baratieri determined on a general retirement, which he hoped to effect under cover of Dabormida's force, then fighting hopelessly in the Mariam Shavita valley. By this time, however, complete confusion reigned in the Italian army. The retreat inexorably turned into a rout as repeated efforts to hold the Ethiopian forces proved abortive. Italian morale collapsed as the exhausted troops struggled back. "They were almost unconscious of their surroundings," says Baratieri, "and careless of every- thing except their individual defence. The officers had lost authority over the soldiers, who looked in a bewildered and stupefied manner at those who gave an order or attempted to halt them." The flight continued into the dark, the Ethiopians pursuing their foes as far as the river Mareb. During the night many Italians, including the commander himself, lost their way. "A terrible destiny," declared Baratieri, "weighed on my head; it was the third time that I had lost my way during the retreat, and my heart was breaking at the long hours during which it had been impossible to give my orders or to receive information."

Major-General Albertone

In chronicling this series of mistakes and mishaps one is entitled to wonder what would have been the course of events if the Italians had employed other tactics. A. B. Wylde's reply to this question is as follows: "The opinion of Ras Alula and many of the Abyssinian generals was that it made very little difference what took place the moment the Italians made their fatal advance, and if they had made the surprise complete and lined the position, they would still have been beaten and crushed ... I perfectly agree with their opinion, and the loss to both sides would then have been too terrible to contemplate." As the survivors of the routed army retreated across the Eritrean frontier panic spread among the entire Italian population. Italian agricultural colonists aban- doned their recently acquired lands and fled to Asmara, and thence to Massawa. The remnants of the army found their way to the fortresses of Adi Ugri, Asmara, Adi Caieh and the Hadras pass. On March 6, Baratieri learnt that even before the battle the Italian Government had decided upon his dismissal; accordingly on that day he handed over to his successor, Baldissera. For a week or so it appeared that Menelik would follow up his victory by advancing into Eritrea; on March 12 he encamped at Feres Mai, an advanced post which seemed to indicate an intention of moving on Gura. On March 20, however, to the great relief of the Italians, he ordered his troops to retire southwards. Afterwards, to a priest of Serae (on the way to Gura), he is reported to have said: "We were very near to your country and intended to go there. I was not able to do so—first of all because we were short of water; and secondly, because many new enemies had arrived, and, as you know, I do not love spilling blood."

"The only thing that prevented King Menelik from following up his complete victory," confirms A. B. Wylde, "was want of provisions to feed his army." Had Ras Alulu been allowed to advance with his army, strengthened by part of Ras Mangesha's force, "there is no doubt," adds A. B. Wylde, "the whole of the Hamasien plateau and the Bogos province, with the exception of the fortified positions of Adi Ugri, Asmara and Keren, would have again fallen into the hands of the Abyssinians . . . the garrisons of these places were not numerous enough to take the offensive in the open, and it would only have been a question of time how long their provisions held out before they would have to capitulate, as it was hardly possible for reinforcements to have arrived from Italy in time to relieve them. The Italian fores, immediately after the battle, was a great deal too demoralised to offer any effective resistance." At the battle of Adowa, the Italians lost, according to their own figures, 2,918 white troops killed, 954 missing, 470 wounded, and 1,865 prisoners; as well as 2,261 Askaris killed and 958 wounded. These losses repre- sented a large proportion of the total force (10,598 Italians and 7,100 Askaris). The debacle was, however, far greater than the figures suggest, for the survivors were completely demoralised. All three major-generals who had taken part in the campaign, Albertone, Arimondi and Dabormida, were killed, and Baratieri's army had ceased to exist as a fighting unit. Among the booty was the entire Italian artillery, some sixty-five cannon, 11,000 rifles and most of the transport. The Ethiopians had lost 5,000 to 6,000 killed and 8,000 badly wounded; among the dead were numbered Kegnazmatch Abeina, Kegnazmatch Tafesse, Dejazmatch Machacha, Fitauraris Gabrel Ehu, Hailu and Tadai, and Dejazmatch Besheer, who died of his wounds on the following day.